

LONDON AND NORTH EASTERN RAILWAY.

Ministry of Transport,

4, Whitehall Gardens,

London, S.W.1.

2nd April, 1931.

SIR,

I have the honour to report, for the information of the Minister of Transport, in accordance with the Order of the 17th January, 1931, the result of my Inquiry into the circumstances of the accident which occurred at about 6.15 a.m. on the 16th January, 1931, near Great Holland signal box, between Thorpe-le-Soken and Clacton-on-Sea, on the Eastern Section, Southern Area, of the London and North Eastern Railway.

The 6.8 a.m. newspaper train, Thorpe-le-Soken to Walton-on-Naze started against signals from Thorpe-le-Soken Junction, and, after wrongly running for over two miles on the single line branch towards Clacton instead of on the Walton branch, collided head-on with an up light engine which was correctly proceeding from Clacton to Thorpe-le-Soken.

I regret to report that two of the Company's servants, driver E. R. Shel-drake and fireman B. S. Wright of the engine of the newspaper train, were killed; and three others, the driver and fireman of the light engine, and the guard of the newspaper train, were injured.

The collision occurred close to Great Holland signal box, where there is a passing loop which is, however, out of use during the winter. The signal box was also closed, and at the time of the accident the line was being worked as one single line section from Thorpe-le-Soken to Clacton-on-Sea.

The newspaper train was drawn by 4-6-0 type engine No. 8578, B-12 class, running tender first, and weighing in working order with 6-wheeled tender about 105 tons, with right hand drive. It consisted of two 6-wheeled brake vans; the total weight of engine and train was about 130 tons. The Westinghouse brake was available for use on all the coupled wheels of the engine and on all the wheels of the tender and train, except the middle wheels of the two vans.

The light engine was No. 8781, 4-4-0 type, D-16 class with 6-wheeled tender, running chimney first, the total weight in working order being about 94 tons. The Westinghouse brake was available for use on all the coupled wheels of the engine and on all wheels of the tender.


The damage to both engines was considerable, and is detailed in Appendix I. The force of the collision was sufficient to lift the whole front end, including the driving wheels, of the light engine clear of the rails and to raise the tender tank of the train engine off its frame; the tender frames were also very badly buckled.

The damage to permanent way was not serious.
It was a fine, clear, dark morning.

Description.

The Company's double line branch from Colchester (North-West) to Thorpe-le-Soken Junction (South-East) divides at the latter station into two single line branches. The down line continues in a direction generally East through Kirby Cross and Frinton to Walton-on-Naze, the extension of the up line in a south-easterly direction forming the branch to Clacton-on-Sea.

Thorpe-le-Soken signal box is situated in the middle of the down platform, at 13 miles 28 chains from Colchester. The portions of the layout at Thorpe-le-Soken station relevant to this Inquiry are indicated in the diagram below. The position of the starting signals, Nos. 25 and 26, with reference to the line to which they apply should be noted.



The two single line branches continue parallel and close beside one another to a point near the $14\frac{1}{4}$ mile post, i.e., for a distance of about a mile from Thorpe-le-Soken signal box, and they are at the same level almost as far as an occupation crossing situated about $\frac{3}{4}$ mile from the signal box. Thence the Walton branch rises steadily at 1 in 174 to 14 m. 45 chains, while the Clacton branch falls 1 in 83 for about 150 yards and then runs level, so that where the two banks actually divide the Walton branch is some 10 ft. higher than the Clacton branch. From that point onwards the principal characteristics of the two branches and their approximate mileages are as follows:—

Branch towards Walton.

Branch towards Clacton.

Gradients.

Rise 1 in 174 to 14 m. 45 chs.
Rise 1 in 300 from 14 m. 45 chs. to
Kirby Cross Station (15 m. 32 chs).

Rise 1 in 163 to 14 m. 45 chs.
Fall 1 in 112 to 14 m. 67 chs.
Level to 14 m. 75 chs.
Rise 1 in 91 to 15 m. 15 chs.
Fall 1 in 165 to 15 m. 30 chs.
Rise 1 in 100 to point of collision.

Bridges.

Road overbridge at 14 m. 47 chs.

Underbridge (2 girder spans of about
30 or 40 ft.) at 14 m. 70 chs.
Road overbridge at 15 m. 32 chs.

Curves.

Left-handed to about 15 m. 10 chs.
Right-handed from about 15 m.
10 chs. onwards through Kirby
Cross Station.

Right-handed to m. $14\frac{3}{4}$.
Straight to 15 m. 10 chs., left-handed
to 15 m. 32 chs., right-handed to
point of collision.

Level Crossings.

Park Lane crossing gate signal at
15 m. 5 chs.

Occupation crossing at m. $14\frac{1}{2}$.
Occupation crossing at m. $14\frac{3}{4}$.

Great Holland signal box is situated at 15 m. 46 chs. and the point of collision is 69 yards on the Clacton side of it. The line is in fairly deep cutting on the Thorpe-le-Soken side, and in shallow cutting on the Clacton side of the passing loop, which is about 1,000 ft. long and on a bank of moderate height. The line here is on a curve of about 42 chs. radius right-handed when going towards Clacton, and the two drivers could therefore not have seen one another till they were about 470 yards or less apart.

Both single line branches are worked with standard Tyers No. 6 single line tablet instruments. The starting signals at Thorpe-le-Soken are each controlled by these instruments, the release being effective once only, so that when a tablet has been withdrawn, and the appropriate starter has been lowered and replaced, it cannot be lowered again until the tablet has been replaced in one of the instruments, and another withdrawn with the concurrence of the signalman in advance.

Apart altogether from the station names engraved on them, the tablets for the two branches are unmistakable. That for the Clacton branch is made of fibre and has a large round hole in the centre; that for the Walton branch is of brass and iron with a large square hole in its centre.

The relevant locking at Thorpe-le-Soken, which had not been altered in any way since the accident, and which I found correct, ensures that (a) the down home signal No. 2 cannot be lowered unless the scissors crossings (Nos. 36 and 41) are set for the straight road, (b) the Walton branch starter from the back platform (No. 26) cannot be lowered unless the crossover (No. 41) is set for that branch, and the Walton branch tablet has been withdrawn by the signalman, (c) the Clacton branch starter (No. 25) from the same platform cannot be lowered unless the scissors crossings (Nos. 36 and 41) are set for the straight line and the Clacton branch tablet has been withdrawn by the signalman, (d) if the Walton branch starter (No. 26) from the back platform is lowered, the down home signal (No. 2) is held at danger, and conversely.

Evidence.

Porter-signalman A. G. Appleton, who was on duty at Thorpe-le-Soken at the time of the accident, said that he accepted the newspaper train from Clacton at 5.53 a.m.; it came to a stand with the engine opposite his box at 6.1 a.m. and "Train out of section" was given by him to Clacton at 6.2 a.m. As this train had to proceed to Walton after the engine had run round, he had obtained a tablet for it from the Kirby Cross instrument at 5.58 a.m., i.e., before its arrival at Thorpe-le-Soken. Appleton saw the porter, Southgate, exchange the tablets with the driver, and gave the necessary signals for the engine to run round through points No. 17 and the up main line. Appleton had accepted the 12.10 a.m. goods train ex Spitalfields from Weeley at 5.41 a.m. and received "Train entering section" for it at 5.58 a.m., before the newspaper train from Clacton had reached Thorpe-le-Soken. He lowered the down home signal (No. 2) for the goods train while the engine of the newspaper train was backing over the points No. 37 on to its train. While he was waiting for the goods train to pass the home signal the newspaper train moved forward, as he thought drawing up to the starter to wait for it to be lowered. At this time Appleton was watching the down goods train which was approaching the down home signal, and when he turned again to look at the newspaper train it was opposite the pump house on the south side of the line close to the facing points (No. 41) on the Clacton branch; it would then have been impossible to reverse these points. Appleton said that he had accepted the light engine from Clacton under the warning arrangement as soon as the tablet for the newspaper train had been replaced in the instrument, and he received "Train entering section" for it at 6.3 a.m.; the newspaper train left at 6.6 a.m. When he realised what had happened he went down on to the platform and tried unsuccessfully to attract the attention of the guard of the newspaper train; he thought that he was out of the box for 1½ or 2 minutes. He said that he then returned to his box, telephoned to Clacton to say what had happened, and sent the "obstruction danger" signal. He then sent for the station-master and saw him carry out the tests described below.

Porter W. Southgate said that when the newspaper train arrived from Clacton, Appleton threw the Kirby Cross tablet down to him, he exchanged it for the Clacton one with the fireman, and threw the latter up to Appleton. Southgate then piloted the engine round. The driver was in possession of the Kirby Cross tablet throughout this movement. He was standing up while running round and appeared to be in quite normal health. After the engine had backed on to the train the guard gave the driver a green light and the train started. Southgate did not see if the signalman had lowered any signals for the train. When the signalman shouted "Where's he off to," Southgate turned round and saw that the starter was at danger, the train was then near the pump house. He showed a red light in the hope of attracting the guard's attention. When the newspaper train left, the down goods train was just outside the platform. He called the station-master on the signalman's instructions.

Station-Master F. W. Taylor said that when he was called he went to the signal box as quickly as possible. He found the road set for the Clacton line, the drawer of the Kirby Cross tablet instrument open and empty, and the Clacton

tablet instrument showing "tablet out" which meant that a train was coming from Clacton. Mr. Taylor immediately set the road from the back platform to the Walton line and lowered the Walton starting signal, which came off without difficulty. He then replaced this signal and tried to lower it a second time, but was unable to do so, thus proving that it had not previously been lowered since the tablet had been released. Mr. Taylor said that in the absence of himself and the foreman the signalman should hand the tablet to a driver, but he considered it correct for the actual exchange to be made by the porter provided the signalman saw him do it. The lamp for the back platform starting signal to Clacton had never been lit during the three years he had been at Thorpe-le-Soken. Mr. Taylor had never himself been out to superintend the working at this hour of the morning nor did he think the foreman had ever done so. He said that he had never himself actually given a tablet to a driver before he had run round his train or while still shunting, though he would have done so on this occasion if he had been on duty.

Lieut.-Colonel H. H. Mauldin, Superintendent Eastern Section, did not consider that the driver was given the tablet too soon in this case.

Signalman E. W. Girling, who was on duty at Clacton, said that he asked "line clear" for the newspaper train from Thorpe-le-Soken at 5.42 a.m. and it was immediately accepted. He gave "train entering section" at 5.52 a.m. and Thorpe-le-Soken gave "train out of section" at 6.1 a.m., having then restored the tablet to the instrument. Girling then asked "line clear" for the light engine, which he said was accepted by Thorpe-le-Soken at 6.1 a.m. under the warning arrangement. The road was set and signals lowered; the light engine left at 6.6 a.m. after the driver had been verbally cautioned by Girling. At 6.9 a.m. Girling said that he received the telephone message from Appleton that the newspaper train was coming back to Clacton on the wrong road; the "obstruction danger" signal was received at 6.11 a.m. The light engine had left before its booked time, which was 6.10 a.m.

Firefighter W. H. Reynolds at Clacton said that he saw driver Sheldrake and fireman Wright when they signed on duty at 4.40 a.m. He noticed nothing unusual about either of them.

Fitter A. J. Wright said that he arrived at the scene of the accident about 9 a.m. He found the regulator of the train engine, No. 8578, shut, the Westinghouse brake handle in the release position, and the vacuum brake handle in the position for running when this brake is not in use. The Westinghouse brake was connected up on the train. The Westinghouse brake handle of the light engine was in the release position, but he thought it had been forced thus by the coal which fell down from the tender. Wright found the Thorpe-Kirby Cross tablet hanging on the damper gear of the train engine, and the Clacton-Thorpe tablet on the floor of the cab of the light engine. He showed them to Mr. Hare, Assistant District Locomotive Superintendent, who confirmed this.

Shunter T. F. Chalk said that he walked from Clacton to the scene of the accident and on arrival there found driver Sheldrake on the engine in a sitting position, and his fireman on the footplate with his head towards the firebox; both men were dead.

Guard E. Elliston, of the newspaper train, said that he spoke to driver Sheldrake when his engine backed on to the train at Clacton and did not notice anything wrong or unusual about him or his fireman. The train arrived at Thorpe-le-Soken at 6.1 a.m., and the engine ran round. He saw the tablets exchanged before it did so. After the engine had been coupled up he saw that the brake gauge was reading correctly, gave "right away" and got into his van as the train started. Elliston said that the engine was close to the starting signals but he did not look for or see them, and it "never crossed his mind to do so." If he had looked from the other side of his van he thought he might have seen them. He said that he had sorted the contents of the Clacton van on the way down from Colchester, and had in the Walton van several bundles of papers for Kirby Cross which he was preparing; he therefore did not notice that he was on the wrong road. He described the features of the two branches quite correctly. Elliston at first said that he thought the sorting of parcels and mail bags was his most

important duty, and that when not otherwise engaged he looked after the safety of his train, which he would stop if he saw any danger. But on re-examination he modified this by saying that he did not look on the sorting of parcels as more important than the safety of the train; he considered all his work important, and meant that he had very little time to sort parcels so that it had to be done between stations to avoid delay.

Driver G. Goodridge, who was in charge of the light engine, said that he got the tablet and left Clacton about 6.7 a.m. after being warned by the signalman. He thought he was going at the normal speed of 12 or 13 m.p.h. when the collision occurred. The regulator was then shut and brake off, the firebox door was nearly shut and the engine had not been fired since leaving Clacton.

Driver W. G. Ince was in charge of the 12.10 a.m. goods train Spitalfields to Clacton. He said that he arrived at Thorpe-le-Soken at 6.5 a.m. The down distant was at caution, and he had almost stopped at the down home when it was lowered. He drew forward to a point near the west end of the down platform to detach some wagons, all the signals for his own road being then at danger. He saw the newspaper train start, as he approached the down home signal, which was then at danger but was lowered immediately afterwards.

Fireman R. Newbery, who was with driver Ince, confirmed his evidence and said that the driver was on the left side of the engine. He thought they were 60 or 70 yards from the down home signal when it was lowered. When he first saw the newspaper train he thought it had gone up to the scissors crossing.

Fireman L. A. Wilding, who was with driver Goodridge on the light engine, was still unable, owing to his injuries, to give evidence at my adjourned Inquiry. But in a statement made to the Company's officers he said that he saw the light on the engine of the newspaper train as they approached the points of Great Holland Loop (about 110 yards from the point of collision) and jumped off the engine. He confirmed his driver's evidence as to speed.

Conclusion.

This is the first case of a head-on collision between stations on a single line worked with electric token instruments reported in this country since the Abermule disaster of 26th January, 1921, a fact which in itself forms a sufficient indication of the high standard of efficiency with which such lines are operated. The circumstances in this case are similar in one important feature.

The immediate cause of this accident is quite clear. The late driver Sheldrake, having received the tablet for the Walton branch, started his train from Thorpe-le-Soken against signals before the road had been set for the proper direction, and ran down the Clacton branch, on which the tablet found on his engine after the collision did not authorise him to proceed. No blame attaches to driver Goodridge, who was travelling correctly from Clacton towards Thorpe-le-Soken with the tablet for that branch on his engine.

The local conditions near the point of collision made it practically impossible for either engine crew, however vigilant, to have seen the other engine in time to stop soon enough to avoid a collision. But no satisfactory reason can be found to explain why both Sheldrake and his fireman, Wright, failed to realise that they had been running on the wrong road for over two miles. The physical features of the two lines are entirely different, and there is no evidence to indicate that both men were otherwise than in normal health and fit for duty at the time. Sheldrake had 37 years' service, including 17 years as a driver, and a good record. He had worked on this branch for many years, and had signed the route card quite recently.

A measure of responsibility also rests upon guard Elliston. He was not required by rule to observe the starting signal before giving the "right-away" signal to his driver, and the responsibility for observing it rests entirely with the latter under General Rule 172 (a). But if Elliston had attempted to exchange signals with the fireman as required by General Rule 171 (h), or if he had kept a reasonably good look-out as required by General Rule 177 (a) he could hardly have failed to realise that his train was on the wrong road in time to avert the accident

by an emergency brake application. The relevant rules are reproduced in Appendix II. He knew the road thoroughly, but was, according to his statement, so occupied with his work of sorting some parcels and mail bags that he entirely failed to give a thought to the safety of his train. In his evidence Elliston at first stated that his duty was only to pay attention to the running of his train when not otherwise engaged; but, although he subsequently modified this in re-examination, I am reluctantly forced to the conclusion that he is a man who has not cultivated the habit of regarding the safety of his train as of primary importance, which I am glad to say is one of the outstanding characteristics of the vast majority of railway employees of all grades in this country. He has 44 years' service, including 30 years' experience as a guard working on these branches and has a good record.

Although the failure of the trainmen was the primary cause of the accident, in my opinion the working at Thorpe-le-Soken Junction on the morning in question largely contributed to it. Signalman Appleton and porter Southgate certainly broke the Rule contained in paragraph 1 on page 117 of the Company's Rules for working the electric train tablet which lays down that, in the absence of special instructions to the contrary, the signalman is the sole person authorised to exchange the tablet with the driver. Southgate was not so authorised. If Appleton had left his box to give the tablet personally to the driver, it is quite possible that he would have set the road for the Walton branch before doing so, and thus have averted this accident. In any case, Appleton must have had some difficulty in seeing what was going on in the dark and, as soon as a signalman is unable to do this, the object of this Rule is defeated.

The practice of giving a driver the tablet before the engine is attached to the train and ready to start is also, I think, undesirable, though not specifically forbidden by the rules. In this case the tablet had been withdrawn some three minutes before the arrival of the train, although shunting had to be performed. There may be circumstances which render this practice necessary at some places, but this does not seem to be the case at Thorpe-le-Soken, and premature possession of the tablet by the driver, under the conditions existing there, contributed, in my opinion, to the accident.

The newspaper train appears to have actually left Thorpe-le-Soken about four minutes before its booked time, while the down goods train, which was booked to arrive at Thorpe-le-Soken at 6.0 a.m., i.e., before the booked departure time of the newspaper train for Walton at 6.10 a.m., had in fact done so on 21 occasions during the last three months. This latter contingency was therefore one to which signalman Appleton should not have been unaccustomed. But, while giving him credit for a desire to cause the least possible delay, I think that his action in not holding the down goods at his home signal, until the newspaper train had left on its proper road, was a serious error of judgment, having regard to the time available, the layout of the station yard, and the somewhat short over-run available beyond the down home signal.

When he discovered what had happened Appleton seems to a certain extent to have lost his head. In view of the close agreement between the times booked at Clacton and at Thorpe-le-Soken boxes for the other movements referred to in the evidence, I do not accept his evidence that he received "Train entering section" for the light engine from Clacton at 6.3 a.m., against Girling's evidence that it was sent at 6.6 a.m. The point of collision is so nearly halfway between Thorpe-le-Soken and Clacton that I believe that both the train and the light engine started almost simultaneously at or about 6.6 a.m., and the damage to the engines was not inconsistent with a speed in each case of 10 to 20 m.p.h. If, therefore, Appleton had *immediately* given "obstruction danger" on the block bell, there was a chance that Girling might have been able to stop the light engine in time to avoid the collision by throwing to danger his advanced starter, which is some 340 yards in advance of his box. Appleton, however, left his box in an attempt, which, though perhaps not unnatural, was almost bound to fail, to stop the departing train after it had passed the starting signal, and only gave "obstruction danger" when it was too late to have any useful effect.

For the reasons indicated above Appleton must, I think, accept some responsibility for this accident. He has 15 years' service including nearly four years' experience as porter-signalman at Thorpe-le-Soken. His record is good.

The importance of strict observance of the Rules regarding the handling of the tablet was of course one of the lessons of the Abermule accident already referred to. But apart from this, the evidence seems to disclose a general laxity in the early morning working at Thorpe-le-Soken which had apparently been going on for some time unchecked by the presence or supervision of any of the Senior staff. The unauthorised omission to light the lamp of the starting signal from the back platform towards Clacton is also significant, and the Company will no doubt take steps to ensure generally stricter observance of rules at this station.

In view of this accident I think that the Company should be asked to consider—

(a) the amendment of the rules regarding the duties of a guard already referred to, so as to leave no doubt as to the primary importance of attention to the safety of his train at all times,

(b) stricter enforcement of the rules in para. 1 on page 117 of the Company's book of rules regarding the working of the electric train tablet instruments (reproduced in Appendix II) against unauthorised handling of single line tokens,

(c) the desirability of making a rule to the effect that the token should not be given to a driver till his train is ready to start, unless special authorisation to the contrary is given in specific cases where local conditions make this necessary.

This accident was due entirely to human failure, and it is therefore proper to consider what mechanical devices could have prevented it. The provision of any of the following at Thorpe-le-Soken would have had this effect:—

(a) A system of Automatic Train Control giving a brake application at the starter.

(b) A facing trap with or without sand drag at the starter.

(c) The provision of locking between the point levers and tablet instruments, such that the tablet could not be obtained till the road had been set for the branch to which it applies.

The following would also in all probability have prevented the accident:—

(d) The siting of the starting signals Nos. 25 and 26 on the left of the line to which they refer.

(e) A detonator placer working in conjunction with the starter.

(f) An advanced starting signal for each branch with a similar detonator placer.

In view of the layout and the nature of the traffic at this place, and particularly of the need for care in working between the double line and the two single line branches, I think the Company should be asked to consider the desirability of providing one or other of the above safeguards at this station. In my opinion a facing trap with sand drag would be preferable.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient Servant,

E. P. ANDERSON,

Lieut.-Colonel.

The Secretary,

Ministry of Transport.

APPENDIX I.

*Damage to engines, tenders and brake vans.**Engine No. 8578. Train engine.*

Framing and splashers at trailing end buckled. Cab sides and roof buckled and broken.
Brake gear damaged. Boiler mountings damaged.

Tender No. 8578.

Middle and trailing wheels knocked out and axles bent.
All axleboxes broken.
Tank completely crushed and buckled.
Main frames badly buckled.
Tender complete wreck.

Engine No. 8781. Light engine.

Bogie sheared from main frames at stretcher plate angles, all framing buckled.
Front buffer beam and framing buckled back to smokebox.
Smokebox crushed in to level of chimney.
Cylinders and covers damaged. Brake gear damaged, leading sand boxes broken, reversing gear damaged, cab splashers buckled, boiler mountings damaged.

Tender No. 8781.

Slight damage to leading end and couplings between engine and tender bent.

Brake van No. 6511.

Buffer rod broken. One end light broken.

Brake van No. 6625.

Two buffer castings broken and rods bent. End boards of body broken.
One buffer beam bent. Side light broken. Vacuum gauge broken off.
Gas cylinder shifted.

APPENDIX II.

(a) *General Rules.*

171.—(h) At the commencement of the journey or when re-starting from a Station, Goods Yard, Siding or Signal, or after being stopped from any exceptional cause, the Driver must, as soon as practicable, after the train has started, satisfy himself that his Fireman has exchanged Hand-signals with the Guard in the rear, so that the Enginemen may be sure that they have the Guard and the whole of the train with them. A short whistle will, if necessary, gain the attention of the Guard for the purpose.

172.—(a) When a train is about to leave a Station, Siding or Ticket Platform, the Signal to start given by the Guard merely indicates that the Station duty or the collection of tickets is completed; and before starting the train, the Driver must satisfy himself that the Line is clear, either by observation or the exhibition of the necessary Signal; when starting, the Fireman must look back to see that the whole of the train is following in a safe and proper manner; and to receive any Signal from the Station-master or Guard that may be necessary.

177.—(a) Guards of Passenger trains must carefully watch the running of their trains when approaching important Junctions, terminal Stations, and Stations at which they are booked to stop, and take any action that may be necessary. They must also keep a good look-out on other parts of the journey when not engaged with other necessary duties. If the train is fitted with the Continuous Brake, the Guard must, in case of emergency, apply it in order to stop the train, but if the train is not fitted with the Continuous Brake, he must apply his Hand-brake sharply, and release it suddenly. This operation repeated several times should, from the check it occasions, attract the notice of the Driver, to whom the necessary Danger Signal must be exhibited.

(b) The Guard of a Goods train must keep a good look-out, and should he see any reason to apprehend danger he must use his best endeavours to give notice thereof to the Driver. If the train is fitted with the Continuous Brake, the Guard must, in case of emergency, apply it in order to stop the train, but if the train is not fitted with the Continuous Brake, he must apply his Hand-brake sharply, and release it suddenly. This operation repeated several times should, from the check it occasions, attract the notice of the Driver, to whom the necessary Danger signal must be exhibited.

(b) *Regulations for Working Electric Train Tablet.*

1. Custody and transference of Tablet.—Except as provided in Clause 36, the Signaller or other person in charge of the Tablet Working for the time being is the sole person authorised to take a Tablet from, or place it in, the Instrument; and, except where some other person is specially appointed to the duty, or an Apparatus is provided, the Signaller is the sole person authorised to receive a Tablet from, and deliver it to, the Engine-driver, who, while it is in his charge, must carry it in the place provided for the purpose. Under no circumstances, except as provided in Clauses 14, 14A, 35, and 20, must a Tablet be transferred from one train to another without being passed through the Instrument and dealt with in accordance with these Regulations. The number of the Tablet carried by each train must be entered in the Train Register Book.

Note.—When necessary, in the case of non-stopping trains, two competent men may be employed, one to receive and the other to deliver the Tablet.