

INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION

WASHINGTON

INVESTIGATION NO. 2938

THE CLEVELAND, CINCINNATI, CHICAGO AND ST. LOUIS
RAILWAY COMPANY

REPORT IN RE ACCIDENT

AT GARD, ILL., ON

OCTOBER 2, 1945

SUMMARY

Railroad: Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago and St. Louis

Date: October 2, 1945

Location: Gard, Ill.

Kind of accident: Rear-end collision

Equipment involved: C.C.C. & St. L. : C. & E. I. passenger track motor-car : train

Train number: : 523

Engine number: : 1003

Consist: Motor-car 2713 : 4 cars

Estimated speed: Unknown : 70 m. p. h.

Operation: Movements with current of traffic by automatic block and train-stop systems; movements against current of traffic by train orders and manual-block system

Track: Double; 1° curve; 0.41 percent ascending grade westward

Weather: Foggy

Time: 6:10 a. m.

Casualties: 4 killed

Cause: Failure to provide adequate protection for movement of track motor-car

Recommendation: That the Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago and St. Louis Railway Company provide adequate protection for the movement of track motor-cars on its line

INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION

INVESTIGATION NO. 2938

IN THE MATTER OF MAKING ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORTS
UNDER THE ACCIDENT REPORTS ACT OF MAY 6, 1910.

THE CLEVELAND, CINCINNATI, CHICAGO AND ST. LOUIS
RAILWAY COMPANY

November 16, 1945.


Accident at Gard, Ill., on October 2, 1945, caused by
failure to provide adequate protection for the
movement of a track motor-car.

REPORT OF THE COMMISSION¹

PATTERSON, Commissioner:

On October 2, 1945, there was a rear-end collision between a track motor-car of the Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago and St. Louis Railway and a passenger train of the Chicago & Eastern Illinois Railroad on the line of the Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago and St. Louis Railway at Gard, Ill., which resulted in the death of four employees.

¹Under authority of section 17 (2) of the Interstate Commerce Act the above-entitled proceeding was referred by the Commission to Commissioner Patterson for consideration and disposition.



Inv. No. 2938
 Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago and St. Louis Railway
 Gard, Ill.
 October 2, 1945

Location of Accident and Method of Operation

This accident occurred on that part of the Illinois Division extending between Pana and Lenox, Ill., 70.6 miles, a double-track line over which trains moving with the current of traffic are operated by automatic block and train-stop systems, and trains moving against the current of traffic are operated by train orders and a manual-block system. Trains of the Chicago & Eastern Illinois Railroad are regularly operated over this line. The track motor-car and the passenger train involved were being operated against the current of traffic on the eastward main track. The accident occurred 61.31 miles west of Pana, at a point 3,330 feet west of the station at Gard. From the east there is a tangent 9.4 miles in length, which is followed by a 1° curve to the right 468 feet to the point of accident and 242 feet beyond. Throughout a distance of 5,132 feet immediately east of the point of accident the grade varies between 0.005 percent and 0.41 percent ascending westward, and is 0.41 percent at the point of accident.

Operating rules read in part as follows:

14. Engine Whistle Signals.

Note.--The signals prescribed are illustrated by "o" for short sounds; "___" for longer sounds.
* * *

Sound.	Indication.
(q) ___ o	When running against the current of traffic: (1) Approaching stations, curves, or other points where view may be obscured. * * *

* * *

92. A train must not leave a station in advance of its schedule leaving time.

FORMS OF TRAIN ORDERS

* * *

D-R

Providing for a Movement Against the Current of Traffic.

- (1) No 1 has right over opposing trains on No 2, or eastward, track C to F.

The designated train must use the track specified between the points named and has right over opposing trains on that track between those points. * * *

* * *

Bulletin order No. 222-S-102, issued August 2, 1945, read as follows:

Effective 8:00 AM August 6, 1945, you will receive the following instructions when running in advance of schedule on double track:

"You may run in advance of your schedule from _____ to _____
Rule 92 modified accordingly."

Instructions issued October 17, 1939, to train dispatchers read in part as follows:

"When it becomes necessary to cross a train over after you have given Section men or Motor cars a line up and they do not know you are going to cross a train over, you will give freight trains a permissive signal and a message telling them reason you are giving them a permissive signal. On passenger trains when emergency compels you to cross them you will give them message advising them be on lookout for motor cars Etc as motor cars have no advance information that they are being crossed over"

* * *

Rules governing the operation of track motor-cars read in part as follows:

1902. The operation of track motor * * * cars must be in charge of qualified employes. * * *

1918. Employes in charge of operation of cars must obtain, so far as possible, and in writing when practicable, information concerning train and engine movements. Such information will not relieve persons in charge from insuring full protection. When conditions require, protection from train dispatcher must be obtained.

1919. Cars must be operated with the expectation of finding main track in use. A lookout for approaching trains must be maintained in both directions.

The maximum authorized speed for the passenger train was 80 miles per hour and for the motor car, 20 miles per hour.

Description of Accident

C.C.C. & St. L. track motor-car 2713 departed west-bound from Livingston, the last open office, 12.88 miles east of Gard, about 5:31 a. m., and while moving against the current of traffic on the eastward main track at an unknown speed it was struck by No. 523.

No. 523, a west-bound C. & E.I. passenger train, consisted of engine 1003, one milk car, one baggage car and two coaches, in the order named. The first car was of steel-underframe construction, and the remainder were of all-steel construction. At Livingston the crew received manual-block authority for their train to proceed from Livingston to Lenox, and copies of train order No. 109 reading as follows:

No 523 Eng 1003 has Right
Over Opposing trains on
Eastward track Livingston
to Lenox

This train passed Livingston at 5:57 a. m., 3 minutes in advance of its schedule leaving time, and while moving against the current of traffic on the eastward main track at an estimated speed of 70 miles per hour it struck track motor-car 2713.

Motor-car 2713 was demolished. The front end of the engine of No. 523 was slightly damaged.

It was foggy at the time of the accident, which occurred about 6:10 a. m.

The employees killed were two section foremen and an assistant signal maintainer, who were occupants of the motor-car, and a gang foreman, who was operating the track motor-car.

Discussion

The investigation disclosed that at 5:16 a. m., about 54 minutes prior to the time the accident occurred, the train dispatcher issued by telephone to the operator at Livingston, and to other operators, information that certain passenger trains, including No. 523, were on time. About 30 minutes later, after track motor-car 2713 had departed westward from Livingston, the dispatcher decided to operate No. 523 against the current of traffic on the eastward main track from Livingston to Lenox in order to expedite the movement of other west-bound passenger trains on the westward main track. Before the dispatcher issued the train order authorizing this movement, he asked the

operator at Livingston whether copies of the train line-up had been delivered to the operator of any track motor-car. The dispatcher understood the operator to say that no copies of the line-up had been delivered, but the operator was positive that he had informed the dispatcher that copies had been delivered to the foreman who was operating track motor-car 2713. The dispatcher said that if he had been informed that copies of the line-up had been delivered to the operator of the motor-car involved he would not have authorized No. 523 to operate against the current of traffic.

The enginemen of No. 523 said that throughout a considerable distance in the vicinity of Gard trailing smoke from a west-bound train moving on the westward main track and fog materially restricted their view of the track ahead. They first saw the preceding motor-car about 100 feet distant. The engineer moved the brake valve to emergency position, but the collision occurred before the train could be stopped. The engineer said that he was sounding the whistle signal indicating that his train was operating against the current of traffic when his engine was a short distance east of the point where the accident occurred. The motor-car was designed for a maximum speed of 31 miles per hour. The speed of the train was about 70 miles per hour when the accident occurred. Why the motor-car was being operated on the eastward main track against the current of traffic without protection could not be determined, as the occupants of the motor-car were killed in the accident. The track supervisor who had charge of maintenance-of-way employees in this territory said that employees are permitted to operate motor-cars against the current of traffic provided that they furnish proper protection in accordance with the rules. Under the rules of the carrier, if the preceding movement had been a train instead of a motor-car, manual-block protection would have been provided, and the following passenger train would not have been permitted to enter a block occupied by a preceding train.

During the 22-month period immediately preceding the date of the accident at Gard, the Commission investigated six accidents in which track motor-cars collided with trains. These accidents resulted in the death of 11 and the injury of 18 persons, and were caused by failure to provide adequate protection for the movement of the track motor-cars. In the present case, the crew of the train involved had no information whatever that the motor-car was being operated. The information furnished the operator of the motor-car was not sufficiently complete to enable him to safeguard the movement. The practices in effect were not adequate to provide proper protection for the movement of the motor-car.

Cause

It is found that this accident was caused by failure to provide adequate protection for the movement of a track motor-car.

Recommendation

It is recommended that the Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago and St. Louis Railway Company provide adequate protection for the movement of track motor-cars on its line.

Dated at Washington, D. C., this sixteenth day of November, 1945.

By the Commission, Commissioner Patterson.

(SEAL)

W. P. BARTEL,
Secretary.